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Bruno Strasser’s Collecting Experiments is an essential book to understand the present ‘big data’ 
situation in the experimental life sciences. It provides a solid framework to interpret the 
relationship between collecting data and experimenting in biology, it thoroughly shows how we 
got to the present ‘big data’ biology situation, and it articulates suggestions on how we should 
interpret bioinformatics as a discipline and its relation to experimental biology, even though this 
is not his central goal. But it should not be read in isolation.  Rather, it has to be considered in 
tandem with other important scholarly works, such as, but not limited to, November’s 




What I intend to do in this review is to provide (1) some context to understand the book, 
(2) a summary of the main contents with emphasis on the important contributions that it 




Strasser’s book is motivated by an urgent need to understand the big data revolution in biology. 
The significance of the so-called ‘data-driven’, or ‘data-intensive’ turn in biology has been 
widely debated, in particular its epistemological magnitude, and the changes in how biologists 
perceive their profession. But, according to Strasser, in order to understand what happened in the 
past 30 years or so we should take a step back, and realize how the interplay between databases 
and molecular biology is only an instance of a general dynamics affecting the experimental life 
sciences in the 20th century. Therefore, Strasser’s book “is about the development and use of data 
collections in the experimental life sciences from the early twentieth century to the present” (6).   
A work on the role of collections in the experimental life sciences is important and timely 
because something about collecting and experimenting has been perceived throughout the history 
of biology as in sharp opposition, as if there was a science war between the two. Strasser lists 
some ways in which this opposition has been conceptualized. For instance, the opposition has 
been understood as a tension between natural history disciplines such as taxonomy, 
paleontology, etc., and experimentalists since the mid-19th century. Others tried to make sense of 
the opposition by building it around the ‘laboratory’ against the ‘museum’. But Strasser seems to 
identify the real opposition in something even more fundamental, which is the value of 
biological diversity and comparisons versus the narrow focus or ‘exemplarism’ of many of the 
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experimentalists such as those working on model organisms. He characterizes this opposition as 
a tension between two ‘ways of knowing,’ “the comparative and the experimental, the former 
centered on collections and the latter on exemplary systems” (16). Strasser refers explicitly to 
Pickstone’s ways of knowing, and he stresses that these are analytical rather than taxonomical 
categories: comparing and experimenting are “the ingredients, coexisting in different 
proportions” in the life sciences of the 20th century (16). Against the ‘opposition narrative’, 
Strasser’s book is about how these two ways of knowing somehow interacted and most of the 
times hybridized in the life sciences in the 20th century. Therefore, this book “is not about the 
clash of scientific disciplines or research fields (natural history against molecular biology), but 
about the historical dynamics of their epistemic components (comparing and experimenting)” 
(16). The same dynamical interactions between experimenting and comparing is at play in the 




Strasser starts the story of the dynamics between comparing and experimenting by reconstructing 
the importance of collections of organisms for those community of experimentalists that were 
genuinely ‘exemplarists’, such as those who worked on selected model organisms. The important 
point that Strasser wants to make in Chapter 1 is that stock collections have been for 
experimentalists in the life sciences what museums have been for naturalists. In particular, they 
played the role of repositories of organisms, centers of standardization, centers of distribution, 
tools for research, centers for coordination, and even as institutions defining social and epistemic 
norms.  Ingredients of the ‘comparing’ way of knowing materialized in these stock collections by 
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providing “a standardized and stabilized nature for scientists to study” (64), even though 
classification per se was not a concern, unlike in natural history.  
Chapter 2 is about those who promoted the ‘experimentalization’ of taxonomy. Strasser 
reconstructs how species came to be studied at the biochemical level, in particular by finding 
ways to analyze blood and its many components. What is striking about this chapter is that the 
transformation of taxonomy via biochemical analysis was motivated as a way to amend and 
rectify the subjectivism intrinsic to taxonomical studies based on morphology. In other words, 
studying species at the molecular level provided a mean to ‘quantify’ and make more objective 
the way biologists classified species. ‘Objectivity’ was a virtue held in high regard by 
experimentalists. This is a case of epistemic virtues of experimentalists being transferred to the 
context of natural history.  Even though “epistemic practices remained largely those of 
naturalists: they were still collecting and comparing, although in the form of experimental data 
instead of bones and fossils” (107). 
 In Chapter 3, Strasser analyzes the other side of the coin: how experimentalists 
hybridized with a comparative culture, in particular in biochemistry. He describes in detail the 
achievements of Margaret Dayhoff who created the first sequence database. The Atlas of Protein 
Sequence and Structure, which was published at first in book format in 1965, paved the way to 
electronic databases. Dayhoff positioned her Atlas firmly within the experimentalist tradition. 
Strasser lists some of the discoveries that Dayhoff was able to make using the Atlas, thereby 
showing the importance of comparative approaches for experimentalists in generating 
hypotheses that could be explored in the laboratory. According to Strasser, the Atlas exemplifies 
a hybrid practice: “the production of knowledge through the collection, comparison, and 
computation of data rested on the comparative and experimental ways of knowing” (153).  
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 In Chapter 4, Strasser delineates the history of an analogous collection for 
crystallographers, this time of protein structures: the famous Protein Data Bank (PDB), 
published in 1971. PDB reflected the importance and the impact of three-dimensional computer 
graphics and computer networks in experimental crystallography. These technological tools 
offered clear advantages with respect to the typical ‘physical models’ of protein structures: 
manipulating virtual models rather than building actual physical models made modeling a much 
more effective practice. Moreover, virtual models enhanced the process of identifying the 
position of each atom in the structure – “with physical models, researchers had to tediously 
measure the relative position of each atom with a ruler” and “interactive possibilities … allowed 
researchers to ‘see’ and ‘manipulate’ molecules as if they were real objects” (160). Therefore, 
PDB is one example of a collection that became a tool to generate experimental knowledge, and 
not just a repository of data. But PDB was also used as a taxonomic tool, “for bringing order into 
the great diversity of structures it contained … hierarchical categories, families, and 
superfamilies, following a standard taxonomic practice” (176). In other words, PDB represents a 
hybridization of the two ways of knowing. In fact, PDB “developed as an institution for the 
preservation and distribution of knowledge … [and] it became an instrument for the production 
of new knowledge” alongside laboratory instruments (191). 
Chapter 5 reconstructs the history of the development of GenBank, which paved the way 
to a new set of theoretical research practices based on comparison and computation that came to 
be known as bioinformatics or computational biology. GenBank is an interesting case study for a 
number of reasons. First, it is a paradigmatic example of how databases are not mere 
repositories, but rather tools for producing knowledge. Moreover, GenBank is interesting 
because it was created as a public, open, and free resource even if it was developed in the context 
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of molecular biology in which there was, at the time, a push to patent almost everything. Even if 
researchers have been reluctant to share data at first, as soon the right system of incentives was 
provided data started to flow. GenBank reflects two major transformations in the experimental 
life sciences at the end of the 20th century. On the one hand, the changing moral economies of 
the rise of open access, and the “changing research practices made possible by electronic 
databases (the rise of comparative practices)” (224). In Chapter 6, issues of open science and 




I want to conclude this review by highlighting two aspects of the big data biology landscape that 
the book does not describe in detail. Nonetheless, the book offers a valid starting point to 
develop them. This is not a criticism of the book. Rather, given the complexity of the 
transformations in the experimental life sciences in the 20th century, it is impossible to cover all 
possible angles. 
First, there is the relation between computer science and biology. Strasser describes in 
great detail how computational infrastructures and computational tools have facilitated practices 
where comparing and experimenting hybridized creating a new culture, and even a new 
discipline, bioinformatics. But sometimes I had the impression that computer science comes out 
of nowhere. In other words, computer science seems to be a mere tool, out there, for biologists to 
use. For this reason, I had the impression that what Strasser is describing is not a real synthesis 
between computer science and biology, but rather a mere instrumental use of the former by the 
latter. But to use Stevens’ words, “the computer [in biology] brought with it epistemic and 
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institutional reorganizations” (Stevens 2013, 39). I look forward to reading and maybe 
researching more about this. Moreover, it should also be noted that an impression of 
‘instrumental relation’ rather than real synthesis, sometimes emerges also in the way Strasser 
describes the dynamics between comparing and experimenting. Strasser describes the relation 
between the two ways of knowing “as the emergence of a ‘hybrid culture’ rather than as the 
domination of one culture over the other” (107). However, at times the nature of this 
hybridization was not entirely clear to me. How are we supposed to understand this integration? 
Are the cases described by Strasser examples of interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, or 
transdisciplinary practices?  Is there a real synthesis, or it is just practitioners from one discipline 
using instruments or importing epistemic values from another? 
 The second aspect about which I would like to hear more is how to characterize 
experimentalism. This is not a petty question, because it has consequences for how we think 
about bioinformatics. If the comparative and the experimental are analytic rather than 
taxonomical categories, then we should find different combinations of these two in the different 
scientific cultures that Strasser describes. In the molecular biology of the end of the 20th century 
the experimental ingredient is the set of practices typical of the experimental life sciences used to 
materially manipulate biological entities, while the comparative part is the use of databases. But 
what about bioinformatics? It seems to me that Strasser emphasizes the comparative side of 
bioinformatics more than its experimentalist side. He says that the collection “of standardized 
biological data in electronic format opened the door for the development of sophisticated 
algorithms to analyze it … research in silico was becoming a legitimate way of producing 
knowledge about nature” (253). If bioinformatics is a hybrid between the ways of knowing of the 
comparative and the experimental, and the comparative ingredient is clear, where is exactly the 
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experimental? Is it just the fact that it aids experiments, or that it can perform experiments of 
some sort?  
Determining the experimental ingredient of bioinformatics is complicated, because 
bioinformatics is a term that covers a broad range of practices and professional figures. As 
Stevens noted (2013), there are at least two types of individuals working in bioinformatics. First, 
there are those who have been trained as wet-lab biologists, and they have learned how to code 
later. These individuals aim at solving biological problems by training and using algorithms in 
addition to wet-lab procedures. But there are also individuals who have been trained in computer 
science, and they are interested in solving computer science problems in the biological domain, 
such as how to speed up a computational process, how to write portable codes, etc. In the latter 
case, computer scientists are instrumental to biologists. In the former case, this is where 
bioinformatics as a Strasser-type hybrid between comparing and experimenting emerges. But 
what kind of experiments do bioinformaticians do? The answer to this question depends on what 
experiments are. In Strasser’s book, as an analytic, and not a taxonomic, category, ‘experimental’ 
covers a broad range of practices: not just “manipulations intended to uncover causal 
mechanism” (14), but also “results as different as microscopic observations of cells and DNA 
sequence data, all produced through the manipulation of nature, usually in the laboratory, with 
specialized instruments” (14). 
‘Manipulation’ seems to be the keyword here. Together with Federico Boem, I have 
articulated the idea that data mining practices are forms of manipulation of data, even though 
they are not ‘material’ manipulation (Boem and Ratti 2016). We suggest that practitioners in 
bioinformatics ‘manipulate’ data sets with computational tools, via abstraction and idealization. 
In analogous ways molecular biologists manipulate biological entities, even though not in the 
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same ‘material’ way. While I now think that our proposal was weak, it still constitutes a way in 
which we can think about the experimental ingredient in bioinformatics. But this is not the only 
way. For instance, consider the debate about computer simulations and experiments, and to what 
extent and from which point of view these practices are similar. A viable way to delineate the 
‘experimental’ ingredient in bioinformatics may be to consider the different angles through 
which computer simulations and experiments have been compared, and see if some shed light on 
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